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This Article examines agency-level activity during the preproposal rulemaking 
phase—a time period about which little is known despite its importance to policy 
outcomes—through an analysis of federal agency activity in connection with 
section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act, popularly known as the Volcker Rule. By 
capitalizing on transparency efforts specific to Dodd–Frank, I am able to access 
information on agency contacts whose disclosure is not required by the 
Administrative Procedure Act and, therefore, not typically available to 
researchers. 
I analyze the roughly 8,000 public comment letters received by the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council in advance of its study regarding Volcker Rule 
implementation and the meeting logs of the Treasury Department, Federal 
Reserve, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation prior to the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking. This analysis reveals significant public activity, but also a 
stark difference in investment by financial institutions versus other actors in 
influencing Volcker Rule implementation. It further reveals a greater unity of 
interest among financial market participants than suggested by press reports and 
the provision’s legislative history. Finally, the data shed light on the efficacy of the 
notice and comment process as a means for federal agencies to engage the general 
public and solicit relevant information in advance of rulemaking. 
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in regards to the Volker Rule, just how stupid do you think the 
working class is? we just passed the two bills of financial reform 
and here, not even 3 months later, you big banks are at it again to 
screw joe the plummer. 
– Comment from Ronnie Endre to the Financial  
   Stability Oversight Council, November 6, 20101 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd–Frank”),2 to fanfare and 
criticism. At 848 pages, the mammoth statute amends dozens of existing laws and 
creates major new federal agencies, including the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (“FSOC”) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, with potentially 
broad powers over systemically important firms and consumer protection, 
respectively. It also eliminates the Office of Thrift Supervision, by merging it into 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), and significantly reshapes 
the derivatives markets, by requiring many over-the-counter derivatives to be 
                                                                                                                
    1. Comment from Ronnie Endre, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 6, 2010), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1096 (spelling, grammar, 
capitalization, and punctuation are all retained from the original source).   
    2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered 
sections of the U.S. Code). 
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cleared and traded through exchanges.3 Dodd–Frank will have major regulatory 
and legal consequences for banks and many other financial institutions for years to 
come. It is thus little wonder that both congressional Democrats and the Obama 
administration claimed credit for passing historic legislation that is the toughest 
financial reform since the Great Depression.4 
Many commentators and press members agreed, labeling the legislation 
“sweeping” and the “most ambitious overhaul of financial regulation in 
generations.”5 The reactions of Wall Street interest groups, which promptly and 
vociferously criticized the legislation, confirm this interpretation.6 
Of particular note is section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act, popularly known 
as the “Volcker Rule,” which restricts certain risky activities by banking entities 
and systemically important firms, including proprietary trading and fund 
investment.7 Hailed by President Obama as a “simple and common sense reform” 
in the face of “an army of industry lobbyists from Wall Street,”8 the Volcker Rule 
had the potential to seriously undermine profits at many of America’s largest and 
most profitable financial institutions. Had the big banks finally been brought to 
heel? Not yet. 
One of the most persistent criticisms of Dodd–Frank, and of the Volcker 
Rule in particular, is its many gaps and ambiguities, which leave a host of 
meaningful issues to subsequent interpretation and implementation by federal 
agencies. Many worry that, largely freed from public scrutiny, special interests can 
capture the Dodd–Frank rulemaking process and generate favorable interpretations 
of the statute’s numerous incomplete and contested provisions.9 Others, in 
contrast, point to impediments to special interest capture at the agency level, 
                                                                                                                
    3. Id. § 723, 124 Stat. at 1675–82 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
    4. See, e.g., Senator Jeff Merkley & Senator Carl Levin, The Dodd–Frank Act 
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address 
Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 515 (2011) (labeling Dodd–Frank “the 
broadest financial reforms since the 1930s”); Press Release, White House, Remarks by the 
President at Signing of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 
21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
signing-Dodd–Frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act (referring to Dodd–
Frank as “the strongest consumer financial protections in history”). 
    5. Brady Dennis, Financial Regulation Moves into New Era, WASH. POST, July 
16, 2010, at A1; see also Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B3 (calling Dodd–Frank “a sweeping expansion of federal financial 
regulation” and a “major” Democratic legislative victory). 
    6. Cooper, supra note 5 (reporting that “within minutes” of the presidential 
signing, Wall Street representatives, including the Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, “were leveling criticism at the new legislation”). 
    7. 12 U.S.C. § 1854 (2012). 
    8. Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on Financial Reform 
(Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
financial-reform. 
    9. See infra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (discussing these concerns). 
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including the policy preferences of regulators, judicial review, and procedural 
checks designed to enhance transparency and accountability.10 
This debate raises the question: What happened to major Dodd–Frank 
provisions once lawmaking power shifted from Congress to federal agencies? 
More specifically, are industry groups attempting to influence outcomes? Is there a 
meaningful counterbalance to influential industry voices? What is the public 
salience of the reform? Are relevant public interest groups engaged in the issue? 
And finally, what mode of analysis might yield insight into these questions? 
One mode of analysis is substantive: examine the sausage. This sausage 
approach examines output, usually by measuring Dodd–Frank against an idealized 
version of financial reform—the reform that would have emerged under a perfect 
political system. This comparison might then yield inferences about the lawmaking 
process. For example, a provision that appears overly favorable to particular 
industry segments might lend itself to an inference that the policy outcome is the 
result of special interest influence. In contrast, one that appears to impose costs in 
excess of its benefits might be attributed to pandering by elected officials. Dodd–
Frank analyses have, to date, been of the sausage variety. 
The substantive method has a serious drawback, however: There is little 
agreement on what the ideal response to the financial crisis should have been. 
Moreover, the Dodd–Frank sausage is not yet finished and will not be for many 
years to come. Given that so much of the substantive effect of Dodd–Frank 
depends on still-pending administrative rulemaking, the sausage method is 
especially unsatisfying at this early stage of Dodd–Frank’s existence. 
Alternatively, the procedural, or sausage-making, approach analyzes 
inputs by examining the financial reform sausage as it is being made to see what 
goes into it. What is the level and type of interest group activity? Do lawmakers 
appear receptive to interest group overtures? Is there a counterbalance to 
influential industry voices? What is the public salience of the reform? Are relevant 
public interest groups (“PIGs”) engaged in the issue? 
While the sausage-making approach, alone, inevitably leaves unanswered 
the important question of actual (as opposed to attempted) interest group 
influence, its focus on process provides advantages that the substance-oriented 
sausage approach does not. First, the informal notice and comment process seeks a 
pluralist goal of facilitating engagement opportunities for broad segments of 
society, including individuals and firms, as well as public and private interest 
groups.11 Though technically open to all, administrative law scholars forcefully 
debate the extent to which this ideal is met in practice.12 Second, this spirit of 
openness is in some tension with administrative efficiency, causing many to 
question whether attempts to expand transparency and access in administrative 
                                                                                                                
  10. See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE 
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008). 
  11. Id. at 123–25. 
  12. Id. at 125–33. 
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rulemaking, particularly to the general public, lead to inefficiency.13 Finally, the 
sausage-making procedural approach, when applied after the enactment of final 
rules or rule re-proposals, could capture some of the benefits of the sausage 
approach by systematically examining inputs (for example, in the form of 
comment letters and agency contacts) against changes in output (that is, changes 
from the proposed rule to the final or re-proposed rule). 
This Article, because of the time period studied, adopts the pure sausage-
making approach, using the Volcker Rule as a case study to examine the process of 
Dodd–Frank financial reform from inception through rule proposal, with a 
particular focus on agency-level activity prior to the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (“NPRM”). This Article thus systematically examines a less-studied 
time period about which little is known, despite its acknowledged importance to 
final policy outcomes.14 Later articles will address subsequent stages of Volcker 
Rule activity using a mixed approach that systematically examines both inputs and 
outputs. 
To be clear, this is not a comment on the merits of the Volcker Rule. 
Numerous objections have been raised to the Volcker Rule, some of which I 
recount.15 The Volcker Rule makes for an interesting financial reform case study, 
not because it is wise—that may or may not be the case. Rather, the congressional 
maneuvering that accompanied the Volcker Rule’s passage and the importance of 
proprietary and fund activities to banks’ bottom line signaled that the provision 
had the potential to illuminate questions about which voices get heard on a major 
issue of financial reform as the sausage is really being made. 
Part I of this Article reviews the political and economic events leading to 
Dodd–Frank’s passage, setting the stage for the agency-level activity that 
followed. That review reveals substantial Wall Street lobbying, but also substantial 
public interest in the legislative process surrounding the Volcker Rule, including 
the various accommodations and concessions necessary to gain the votes for 
Dodd–Frank passage. Both the public and the press followed these developments 
closely and expressed frequent concern, even outrage, at signs that the financial 
industry might escape the consequences of its role in precipitating the financial 
crisis. 
                                                                                                                
  13. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent 
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
483, 483–84 (1997) (arguing that attempts by courts to ensure public participation and 
influence in the administrative process have led to inefficiencies and potential ossification). 
  14. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 231–32 (arguing that agencies complete the bulk of their work prior to 
the rule proposal stage and are less responsive to the concerns of affected parties during the 
notice and comment period); Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking 
in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 99, 110–13 (2011) (discussing the dearth of research on the preproposal stage, despite 
its importance). 
  15. See infra notes 36–46 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to the 
Volcker Rule, including capital requirements, other systemic risk regulations, bank 
downsizing, and a return to Glass–Steagall). 
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Part II digs into Volcker Rule activity from Dodd–Frank passage to rule 
proposal. Sections A and B set the stage by discussing reactions to the Volcker 
Rule’s gaps and ambiguities, and the resulting importance of the preproposal 
rulemaking phase. Section C analyzes the roughly 8,000 public comment letters 
received by FSOC during the 30-day public comment period in advance of its 
statutorily required Volcker Rule study, placing these data within the context of 
prior comment letter research. Though scholars may debate the extent to which 
comment letters can—and should—reveal information to agencies,16 comments 
can reveal a great deal of information to the interested researcher, in this case 
exposing both public sentiment and the involvement of relevant PIGs on this issue. 
This analysis shows that a consortium of PIGs—Americans for Financial 
Reform, Public Citizen, and U.S. PIRG—managed to generate a surprising level of 
Volcker Rule interest among private citizens, who sent in letters by the thousands. 
But, 7,316 (or 91%) of those comments are a virtually identical form letter. The 
comment letters from private citizens that were not a form letter (515 comments) 
confirm that people are angry about the economy; about the plight of working 
Americans; and about the politicians who allowed the financial crisis to develop. 
The banks are “fools,” “hogs,” and “criminals” out to “screw joe the plummer” 
and should be “put in jail,” receiving no more “bailouts with citizens’ money.”17 
Political officials and regulators fare little better. 
But at the same time, the contrast with the meticulously drafted, argued, 
and researched—though far less numerous—letters from the financial industry and 
its representatives is stark. In comparison, the citizen letters are short and provide 
little evidence that citizen commenters even understand, or care, what proprietary 
or fund investment is, much less the ways in which agency interpretation of the 
Volcker Rule’s complex and ambiguous provisions might govern such activities. 
Part II.D analyzes meeting logs of the Federal Reserve, United States 
Treasury Department (“Treasury Department”), Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”), Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), which, as part of the new 
transparency efforts associated with Dodd–Frank implementation, were made 
publicly available for the first time shortly after Dodd–Frank was signed into law 
on July 21, 2010.18 It is here that the differential investment by financial 
                                                                                                                
  16. Compare Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public 
Participation and Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 912 (2006) (arguing that 
comment letters—particularly those from the general public—are unlikely to provide 
meaningful information to agencies), and E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992) (referring to notice-and-comment rulemaking as Kabuki 
theater), with Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of 
Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 103, 103–19 (2005) (finding that interest group comments can, and often do, affect 
the content of final government regulations). 
  17. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing these and other comment letters in detail). 
  18. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41472, RULEMAKING 
REQUIREMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN THE DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 11 (2010), available at http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/
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institutions in influencing this early stage of Volcker Rule implementation is most 
evident. Financial institutions, financial industry trade groups, and law firms 
representing such institutions and trade groups collectively accounted for roughly 
93% of all federal agency contacts on the Volcker Rule during the time period 
studied. In contrast, public interest, labor, advocacy, and research groups, and 
other persons and organizations accounted for only about 7%. Moreover, the 
quality of federal agency contacts with financial industry representatives exceeds 
that of other contacts on several measures. Finally, the meeting logs, particularly 
when combined with the comment letters, reveal a level of industry cohesion that 
would not be predicted based on either press reports or the legislative history. 
This Article concludes that, as feared by many Dodd–Frank critics, the 
powerful interest groups most affected by Dodd–Frank did not waste the 
opportunities provided by the Volcker Rule’s gaps and ambiguities. Instead, as 
evidenced by both public comment letters and meeting logs, they actively lobbied 
agencies to adopt favorable definitions, interpretations, and exemptions prior to the 
NPRM. Countervailing voices were not wholly absent during this early stage of 
Volcker Rule implementation. Angry citizens sent in letters by the thousands, 
potentially shading FSOC’s view of the public salience of the Volcker Rule and of 
the relative power of active PIGs. Conclusions regarding the ultimate impact of 
this activity are left for another day. Nonetheless, these results challenge the 
efficiency of current administrative processes and suggest that the pluralist ideal of 
administrative law has not been fully realized, at least in the case of the Volcker 
Rule. 
I. FROM INCEPTION TO PASSAGE 
A. Crisis and Reform 
Dodd–Frank emerged in the wake of the worst U.S. financial crisis since 
the Great Depression.19 U.S. financial firms suffered heavy losses in 2007 and 
2008, largely from sharp declines in the value of mortgage-related assets. Several 
firms failed. Others were saved only through taxpayer bailouts. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were placed in government conservatorship; Merrill Lynch was sold 
to Bank of America in a deal backed by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
Department; Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy; and AIG, facing catastrophic 
losses on credit default swaps, averted default only through an $85 billion loan 
                                                                                                                
files/255/CRS-R41472.pdf (discussing voluntary transparency efforts by the federal 
agencies charged with implementing Dodd–Frank, including logging interest group 
meetings and making such logs publicly available through agency websites). 
  19. The general facts of the financial crisis have by now been retold many times 
in numerous sources. The details in this paragraph are drawn from FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf; The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Policy Actions, FED. RES. BANK 
ST. LOUIS, http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) 
(providing detailed timeline of these events). 
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from the Federal Reserve. In the wake of general financial panic, Congress 
intervened with the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), and 
the Federal Reserve stepped in to provide liquidity through several lending 
facilities. Despite these interventions, the crisis exacerbated already weakening 
economic conditions: asset prices fell; unemployment rose; business investment 
stalled; and consumers suffered losses in housing values, retirement, and 
investment funds. Against this background, Congress and the Obama 
administration launched a financial reform effort. 
The legislation that became Dodd–Frank got its start when the Obama 
administration announced on June 17, 2009, an “extraordinary response to a 
historic economic crisis,” and outlined the basic framework it intended to pursue 
for financial reform.20 This was followed by a more extensive proposal from the 
Treasury Department.”21 
Although President Obama later claimed that Dodd–Frank contained 90% 
of his initial framework,22 early reactions to the proposed reforms were negative.23 
Throughout the second half of 2009, reform advocates from the Obama camp (and, 
in particular, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner) defended the administration’s 
financial reform proposal against critics on both the right and the left. 
Conservative Republicans, for example, portrayed the President’s proposed 
financial reforms as a formalization of the “too big to fail” policies from 2008 and 
as more of the same Big Government outlook that gave us health care reform.24 
The Left, meanwhile, complained that the proposal overly favored Wall Street and 
failed to account for consumer concerns.25 As a consequence, the administration 
was forced to alter certain portions of the proposal that critics contended invited 
bailouts, and to make other concessions.26 
One important concession was the addition of a provision that would limit 
banks’ ability to engage in proprietary trading and to invest in or sponsor hedge or 
private equity funds.27 That provision, known as the Volcker Rule, was highly 
                                                                                                                
  20. Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on 21st Century 
Financial Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform. 
  21. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
  22. Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on Wall Street 
Reform (June 25, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-wall-street-reform-1. 
  23. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 3 (2011).  
  24. Id. 
  25. Id. 
  26. Id. 
  27. Only a single sentence in the Treasury Department’s initial 89-page proposal 
references proprietary trading and hedge funds. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 21, at 
32 (“Finally, the Federal Reserve and the federal banking agencies should tighten the 
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contested, both because of philosophical objections and because it had the 
potential to seriously impact the profitability of banks’ operations.28 The full depth 
of that impact will ultimately depend on interpretation and enforcement, as 
discussed below.	
B. The Volcker Rule: Politics and History 
The Volcker Rule originated in January 2009, when the Group of Thirty, 
an international group of 30 leading finance professionals and academics 
(including Paul Volcker, chair of the financial reform working group, former 
Chairman of the Trustees, and now Chairman Emeritus), released a report 
containing 18 recommendations for global financial reform.29 The first of those 
recommendations proposed that: 
Large, systemically important banking institutions should be 
restricted in undertaking proprietary activities that present 
particularly high risks and serious conflicts of interest. Sponsorship 
and management of commingled private pools of capital (that is, 
hedge and private equity funds in which the banking institutions 
own capital is commingled with client funds) should ordinarily be 
prohibited and large proprietary trading should be limited by strict 
capital and liquidity requirements.30 
But the idea was not initially embraced, either by the Obama administration or by 
House and Senate Democratic leaders. 
The initial House version of Dodd–Frank, introduced by Barney Frank on 
December 2, 2009, did not ban proprietary trading nor did it limit fund 
investment.31 It did, however, grant power to the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System to prohibit proprietary trading if the Board determined 
that it posed “an existing or foreseeable threat to the safety and soundness of such 
                                                                                                                
supervision and regulation of potential conflicts of interest generated by the affiliation of 
banks and other financial firms, such as proprietary trading units and hedge funds.”). 
  28. Christine Harper, Goldman Special Situation Profit Seen at Risk with Volcker 
Rule, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2011, 6:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
28/goldman-special-situation-profit-at-risk-with-volcker-correct-.html (discussing the 
importance of certain proprietary investment activity to Goldman Sachs’ profits); Cyrus 
Sanati, Wall St. Tries to Put a Price on Volcker Rule, DEALBOOK (Jan. 28, 2010, 6:33 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/wall-st-tries-to-put-a-price-on-the-volcker-rule/ 
(estimating the effects of the Volcker Rule proprietary trading ban on various banking 
institutions).  
  29. GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY 
STABILITY (2009), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/G30
Report.pdf. 
  30. Id. at 28. 
  31. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. (as introduced in House of Representatives, Dec. 2, 2009). For a more detailed 
legislative history of the Volcker Rule, see Merkley & Levin, supra note 4, at 531–38. 
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company or to the financial stability of the United States.”32 This portion of the bill 
was passed by the House unchanged.33 
The Senate version, originally introduced by Christopher Dodd on April 
15, 2010, directed the appropriate federal banking agencies to develop rules 
prohibiting both proprietary trading and fund investment and sponsorship.34 These 
prohibitions were subject to the recommendations and modifications of FSOC, 
which was directed to conduct a study regarding the risks and conflicts associated 
with proprietary trading by the entities covered in the bill.35 Both the House and 
Senate versions contained exceptions to these restrictions, many of which were 
retained in the final Dodd–Frank legislation, the details of which are discussed 
below in Part I.C. 
As already noted, the Obama administration’s reform proposal did not 
contain restrictions on proprietary trading or fund investment. Indeed, the 
administration explicitly resisted such limits,36 believing that size and 
interconnectedness—rather than organization as a banking entity—were what 
made an institution too important to fail.37 Many economists agreed.38 
In the wake of the crisis and the bailouts that accompanied it, some 
reform advocates wanted to break up the largest financial institutions so that no 
entity could again be too big to fail.39 Several economists actively involved in 
reform debates, such as Simon Johnson, Joseph Stiglitz, and Nouriel Roubini 
publicly advocated this approach, which gained some adherents in the Senate.40 
                                                                                                                
  32. H.R. 4173, § 1116. 
  33. Id. § 1117 (as engrossed in House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 2009). 
  34. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. 
§§ 619, 989 (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 15, 2010). 
  35. Id. § 989. 
  36. SKEEL, supra note 23, at 54–57. Though Tim Geithner is often depicted as 
the public face of such resistance, other sources paint Larry Summers as the primary 
roadblock to the Volcker Rule within the Obama camp. See RICHARD WOLFFE, REVIVAL: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL IN THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE 170–71 (2011) (discussing 
Larry Summers’s opposition to the Volcker Rule, which he considered “unrealistic and 
unworkable”). 
  37. John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule: Obama’s Economic Adviser and His Battles 
over the Financial-Reform Bill, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 25, 27. 
  38. Id. (“[T]he crisis would have unfolded precisely as it did” even if the 
Volcker Rule had been in effect (quoting Benn Steil, economist at the Council on Foreign 
Relations)); Id. at 30 (arguing that banks were likely to find other ways to take risks and that 
the Volcker Rule could create a false sense of safety (quoting Raghuram Rajan, University 
of Chicago economist)). 
  39. SKEEL, supra note 23, at 49–50. 
  40. See generally Debt Financing in the Domestic Financial Sector: Hearing on 
S. 270 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (testimony of Dr. Joseph Stiglitz) (“We 
should not allow any bank to grow to a size that it poses a systemic risk to the economy.”); 
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT 
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 208–13 (2010) (discussing the risk to the financial system posed by 
large, concentrated financial power and urging a breakup of big banks); Nouriel Roubini & 
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The Brown-Kaufman SAFE Banking Amendment, introduced in the Senate on 
April 21, 2010, would have prohibited bank holding companies from holding more 
than 10% of total U.S. insured deposits and more than 2% of gross domestic 
product (“GDP”) in liabilities and would have imposed other capital requirements 
and leverage restrictions.41 The rule reportedly would have required downsizing by 
some of the largest U.S. banks, including Citigroup and Goldman Sachs.42 It was 
defeated 33–61 on May 6, 2010, with 27 Democrats voting against the 
amendment.43 
Other reformers looked back with nostalgia at Glass–Steagall, which 
since the 1930s had separated commercial and investment banking.44 Since its 
repeal in 1999, the lines between commercial and investment banking had become 
increasingly blurred and proprietary trading had come to represent an ever-larger 
share of the profits of financial institutions, including commercial banks and bank 
holding companies.45 As a result, many—including Paul Volcker himself—
believed that the Volcker Rule would at least partially restore Glass–Steagall’s 
legal divide between commercial and investment banking.46 
Needless to say, affected financial institutions lobbied hard against these 
efforts.47 Just as importantly, the Obama administration also resisted these reforms, 
arguing that Dodd–Frank’s increased oversight of systemically important 
institutions was sufficient to protect against future bailouts.48 However, 
intervening events between introduction and passage of Dodd–Frank continued to 
stoke the American public’s fears of another financial crisis and their anger over 
perceived Wall Street excesses, which necessitated further action from the Obama 
administration if Dodd–Frank was to become a reality. 
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  45. Harper, supra note 28 (discussing the economic impact of the Volcker Rule 
on many financial institutions); Sanati, supra note 28 (same).   
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  48. SKEEL, supra note 23, at 44–52 (discussing the key players in Dodd–Frank 
debates and their various positions); Cassidy, supra note 37, at 27 (discussing the belief by 
Geithner and Summers that capital requirements were a better mechanism for protecting 
against bailouts than either the Volcker Rule or Glass–Steagall). 
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The public detested the 2008 bailouts and, as economic and employment 
fears lingered into 2010, popular backlash increased, reaching a crescendo as news 
of lavish bonuses and compensation packages at bailed-out financial firms hit the 
press.49 Alarmed by the growing public discontent, senior White House officials 
reportedly began to reevaluate Volcker’s reform proposals.50 The final straw came 
on January 19, 2010, when Republican Scott Brown was elected to fill Ted 
Kennedy’s Senate seat in Massachusetts. Two days later, on January 21, 2010, 
President Obama appeared with Paul Volcker and publicly announced his support 
for the Volcker Rule.51 Most observers concluded that the two events were not 
independent.52 
Ironically, however, Scott Brown’s election also prompted some of the 
Volcker Rule’s exemptions and ambiguities. As noted, a strict ban on proprietary 
trading and fund investment had the potential to seriously compromise existing 
banking entity operations. Those financial institutions affected by the rule 
forcefully lobbied key congressional members to weaken it.53 As it became clear 
that Scott Brown’s vote was necessary for Dodd–Frank passage, he wielded 
substantial clout, which he reportedly used to protect Massachusetts firms such as 
State Street, Fidelity, and MassMutual.54 Only after Brown secured a definition of 
“systemically significant” firms that looked to activities, rather than to size 
(reportedly a carve-out for Fidelity), and a de minimis exemption for fund 
investment that would allow banks to invest up to 3% of Tier 1 capital (reportedly, 
a carve-out for State Street), did he provide the last vote needed for Dodd–Frank 
passage.55 
C. The Volcker Rule: Statutory Text 
Subject to important exceptions, the Volcker Rule prohibits banking 
entities from “engag[ing] in proprietary trading” and from “acquir[ing] or 
retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a 
hedge fund or a private equity fund.”56 Systemically important nonbank financial 
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  50. Cassidy, supra note 37, at 28–29. 
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  56. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012). “Banking entity” is broadly defined, with 
some exceptions, to include FDIC-insured depository institutions, entities that control such 
an institution (such as bank holding companies), and the affiliates—i.e., under 25% 
common control—of both of these entities (including non-U.S. affiliates). Id. § 1851(h)(1). 
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institutions are not banned from trading and fund activity, though they must carry 
additional capital and comply with other restrictions on such dealings.57 
The Volcker rule became effective on July 21, 2011, two years after 
Dodd–Frank enactment, despite the lack of implementing rules. However, covered 
entities were granted the full two-year period provided by the statute (that is, until 
July 21, 2014) to comply with the Volcker Rule, with the possibility of 
extensions.58 Both parts of the rule—the ban on proprietary trading and the 
restrictions on fund investment and sponsorship—are subject to substantial 
ambiguities that require agency definition and rulemaking. 
1. Proprietary Trading 
The term “proprietary trading” is defined as “engaging as a principal for 
the trading account of [a] banking entity.”59 “Trading account,” in turn, is defined 
as any account used for acquiring or taking positions: 
principally for the purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise 
with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price 
movements), and any such other accounts as the appropriate Federal 
banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule as provided 
in subsection (b)(2), determine.60 
Much turns on the interpretation of the phrase “trading account,” which is 
unclear and appears to depend on the trader’s intent when purchasing.61 Thus, a 
purchase made with long-term investment intent may be permitted, even if 
ultimately quickly sold.62 Similarly, speculative trades may be permitted under the 
rule, provided they are held beyond the “near term,” however that phrase is 
ultimately defined by regulators.63 
More ambiguity is added by the nine exceptions to the ban on proprietary 
trading explicitly contained in Dodd–Frank, as well as the power granted to the 
federal banking agencies, SEC, and CFTC to draft exceptions to the exceptions in 
order to “promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and 
the financial stability of the United States.”64 Of particular importance are the 
exceptions for transactions in connection with underwriting or market-making 
activities, risk-mitigating hedging activities, and transactions on behalf of 
customers. Each of these is a potentially vast exception, with the potential to 
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  58. Id. § 1851(c).  
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  61. Memorandum from Cadwalader, Widkersham & Taft LLP to Clients and 
Friends, An Analysis of the Dodd–Frank Act’s Volcker Rule 5 (2010), available at http://
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  62. Id.  
  63. Id. at 5–6. 
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permit much trading activity previously undertaken under the rubric of proprietary 
trading. 
2. Hedge and Private Equity Funds 
Subject to essentially the same exceptions that apply to the ban on 
proprietary trading, the Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from “acquir[ing] 
or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or 
sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or a private equity fund.”65 Hedge fund and private 
equity fund are collectively defined as: 
an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.), but for 
section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, or such similar funds as the 
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
may, by rule, as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.66 
Section 619 provides a “de minimis” exception to the restrictions on fund 
activity,67 with the goal of facilitating customer-focused advisory services.68 This 
amount must not exceed 3% of the total ownership interests of the fund one year 
after its inception and must be immaterial to the covered banking entity as defined 
by regulation.69 In addition, the aggregate investments of each regulated banking 
entity in all such funds may not exceed 3% of its Tier 1 capital.70 
As is the case with the restrictions on proprietary trading, the restrictions 
on fund investment require substantial agency definition and clarification. For 
example, the 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exemptions are relied on by a variety of legal 
entities other than hedge and private equity funds. Employee pension funds and 
traditional parent-subsidiary investments thus could be impacted by a strict 
interpretation of section 619, even though these activities do not appear to have 
been within Congress’s intended restrictions.71 At the same time, a strict 
interpretation would exempt certain commodity pools and other risky activities 
from the Volcker Rule’s reach, even though these investments pose similar risks to 
the activities Congress sought to restrict.72 
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D. Section Summary 
In sum, the Volcker Rule originated as a political concession. Dismissed 
by the Obama administration and many economists as unnecessary and 
unworkable, it nonetheless became a necessary element in the campaign to quell 
complaints that Dodd–Frank did not do enough to reign in large, risky financial 
institutions. But for reasons both practical and political, the Volcker Rule that 
emerged from the legislature and was signed into law contained broad gaps and 
ambiguities on key definitional issues. 
An examination of the problems in defining and identifying proprietary 
trading will help illustrate these points. In anticipation of the Volcker Rule, a 
number of affected banking entities shut down or announced an intention to shut 
down their stand-alone proprietary trading desks.73 But, even before Volcker Rule 
passage, stand-alone proprietary trading activity accounted for a relatively small 
amount of banking entity revenues, probably around 3%.74 To avoid an easy end-
run around the Volcker Rule’s restrictions, federal regulators will have to police 
proprietary trading that takes place outside of designated proprietary trading desks. 
This is no easy task. Much of the trading activity explicitly permitted by 
the Volcker Rule—in particular, market making, hedging, underwriting, and 
transactions on behalf of customers—displays objective characteristics very 
similar to proprietary trading, with the distinguishing trait being primarily the 
trader’s motive.75 Many firms, for example, take proprietary positions in the course 
of servicing customer orders or market making, and their trades are argued to 
provide liquidity, especially in thin markets.76 Affected industry members contend 
that zealous enforcement of the proprietary trading ban, which could restrict other 
bank principal positions, would impair customer service, market liquidity, and 
other beneficial functions performed by many banking entities.77 Many banking 
entity customers and other market participants agree.78 Balancing these competing 
concerns and implementing workable and enforceable definitions of permitted and 
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prohibited activity falls to the five federal agencies charged with Volcker Rule 
implementation. 
II. MAKING THE SAUSAGE: FROM PASSAGE TO PROPOSAL 
A. Setting the Stage: Gaps and Ambiguities 
The preceding Part detailed the substantial definitional ambiguities 
surrounding important Volcker Rule provisions, including the definitions of 
“proprietary trading” and its nine exceptions, as well as the definitions of “hedge” 
and “private equity” fund. Other Dodd–Frank sections are similarly indefinite, 
prompting numerous requests for the clarification of definitions, prohibitions, and 
exemptions.79 
Dodd–Frank is conspicuously lacking in particulars, a fact recognized by 
nearly every commentator—popular, academic, and practitioner—to address the 
issue. As The New York Times stated shortly before Dodd–Frank’s passage: 
“[Dodd–Frank] is basically a 2,000-page missive to federal agencies, instructing 
regulators to address subjects ranging from derivatives trading to document 
retention. But it is notably short on specifics, giving regulators significant power to 
determine its impact—and giving partisans on both sides a second chance to 
influence the outcome.”80 
A widely circulated memo by the law firm Davis Polk opined that “the 
legislation is complicated and contains substantial ambiguities, many of which will 
not be resolved until regulations are adopted, and even then, many questions are 
likely to persist” and predicted a “dynamic” regulatory process between market 
participants and regulators.81 Academic commentary similarly has noted the degree 
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to which Dodd–Frank delegates authority and leaves the resolution of serious 
issues to regulators.82 Even the Congressional Research Service acknowledges that 
“many of the changes are likely to be implemented through regulations that are to 
be developed and issued by regulatory agencies.”83 
Many of the statute’s critics worry that this filling-in takes place outside 
of the public glare that accompanied the congressional deliberations on Dodd–
Frank and provides the large Wall Street firms with another opportunity to shape 
the final law in their favor.84 Some fear this potential is heightened as memories of 
the financial crisis fade and the general public—temporarily galvanized by 
financial-institution bailouts into an interest in credit derivatives and systemic 
risk—turns its attention to other political issues. 
These Dodd–Frank gaps and ambiguities assumed new political 
importance as a Republican majority entered the House during the interim period 
between Dodd–Frank’s passage and implementation. Some Republicans, nearly all 
of whom voted against Dodd–Frank, explicitly warned regulators to tread lightly in 
implementing the statute and particularly in implementing the Volcker Rule.85 
Alabama Republican Representative Spencer Bachus, for example, urged FSOC to 
implement the Volcker Rule “in such a way as to minimize its substantial and very 
real costs, given that the gains are likely to be illusory.”86 A group of congressional 
representatives led by Michele Bachmann went further, introducing House Bill 87, 
a one-sentence bill that would repeal Dodd–Frank.87 Finally, budget battles for 
both the SEC and CFTC, each of which require additional resources to fulfill the 
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requirements of Dodd–Frank, have prominently featured critiques of the agencies’ 
lack of attention to the economic impact of their respective regulations.88 
In sum, the Volcker Rule, like many Dodd–Frank provisions, entered the 
administrative process both highly incomplete and highly contested. The federal 
agencies charged with rulemaking under the statute would play a substantial role in 
shaping the final policy outcomes and would likely do so under the continued 
watchful eye of affected industry members and potentially other interested parties. 
The remainder of this Part confirms these intuitions. 
B. The Preproposal Period 
Dodd–Frank required FSOC to study and make recommendations to 
relevant federal agencies regarding Volcker Rule implementation within six 
months of the statute’s enactment.89 Those agencies were then statutorily required, 
within nine months of the completion of the FSOC study, to adopt rules 
implementing the Volcker Rule, based on a consideration of FSOC’s 
recommendations.90 On October 11, 2011, the OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and 
SEC issued an NPRM (hereinafter the “Joint Rule”), requesting comments prior to 
January 13, 2012, on proposed rules to implement the Volcker legislation.91 That 
deadline was later extended to February 13, 2012.92 The CFTC, by a vote of 3–2, 
adopted the entire text of the Joint Rule in an NPRM dated February 14, 2012, 
requesting comments prior to April 16, 2012.93 
The following Subsection analyzes relevant agency activity during the 
period from presidential signing on July 21, 2010 to the NPRM on October 11, 
2011. This Article is one of the few studies to systematically analyze the 
preproposal period, a time period about which little is known, despite its 
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importance to policy outcomes.94 Subsequent articles will analyze the period from 
the October 11, 2011 NPRM to final rule issuance.95 
As Wagner, Barnes, and Peters discuss in detail, the need to produce a 
proposed rule that is ready for comment pushes much regulatory work to this early 
stage of the rule development process.96 As a result, preproposal collaborations 
between agencies and regulated industry members, who are likely to have 
technical and other expertise necessary to produce a rule that withstands judicial 
review, become practical necessities.97 
If much of the real work of final rule creation takes place during the 
preproposal period, then one might predict both substantial preproposal lobbying 
activity and limited changes between rule proposal and final rule. Both predictions 
are generally borne out by existing research.98 However, research on the 
preproposal stage of the rule development process has traditionally been impeded 
by a lack of information; Administrative Procedure Act docketing and other 
transparency requirements are generally limited to the period after publication of 
the proposed rule.99 Dodd–Frank’s transparency innovations thus provide a wealth 
of information previously unavailable to researchers. This Article is the first to 
systematically analyze that information. 
C. FSOC Comment Letters 
1. The Numbers 
The newly formed FSOC’s first action was to request public input on 
Volcker Rule implementation—a request that resulted in more than 8,000 
comments.100 To put this number into context, studies repeatedly show limited 
comment activity in connection with most rulemakings, with the exception of a 
relatively small number of high-salience issues that generate thousands (in a few 
cases, hundreds of thousands) of comments.101 Far more typical, however, are 
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dockets that receive a handful of comments.102 By this standard (and as suggested 
by the legislative analysis in Part I), the Volcker Rule is a relatively high-salience 
issue, particularly for a technical piece of financial reform legislation not yet at the 
rule proposal stage.103 
FSOC concluded that, of these 8,000 comment letters, roughly 6,550 
“were substantially the same letter arguing for strong implementation of the 
Volcker Rule.”104 FSOC gave no further information about these letters and did not 
make them publicly available. But an analysis of the remaining comment letters 
(confirmed by conversations with PIG representatives) reveals that the 6,550 
identical letters are the result of an action campaign by a PIG consortium—
Citizens for Financial Reform, Public Citizen, and U.S. PIRG. Members of these 
groups were provided a form letter (the “PIG form”), included as an Appendix to 
this Article, urging the prompt implementation of the Volcker Rule and the closing 
of any loopholes. 
With the help of three research assistants, I analyzed and hand-coded the 
remaining, roughly 1,450, comment letters.105 FSOC concluded that these 
“remaining 1450 comments each set forth individual perspectives from financial 
services market participants, Congress, and the public.”106 However, this is not the 
case. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on these comments. Figure 1 displays 
this same information graphically. First, the exclusion of duplicate comment 
postings left a total of 1,374 comments. Of these, as detailed in Table 1, 1,281, or 
93%, were submitted by private individuals. The remainder were submitted by 
financial industry members, trade groups, public interest groups, think tanks, 
academics, and congressional members. At first blush, these numbers seem to 
                                                                                                                
102. Id. at 956; John M. DeFigueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory 
at the Federal Communications Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969, 992–93 (2006) (finding 
limited comment activity on the FCC docket, outside of a few outlier events). 
103. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita defines salience as: 
how focused a stakeholder is on the issue. Its value is best thought of in 
terms of how prepared the stakeholder is to work on the issue when it 
comes up rather than some other issue on his or her plate. Would the 
stakeholder drop everything else to deal with the issue? Would the player 
work on it on a weekend day, come back from vacation, etc.? The more 
confidently it can be said that this issue takes priority over other matters 
in the stakeholder’s professional life (or personal life if the issue is about 
a personal or family matter), the higher the salience value. 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Game, PREDICTIONER’S GAME, http://www.predictioneersgame.
com/game (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
104. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 73, at 10. 
105. We collected these comments from Regulations.gov, Docket ID: FSOC-
2010-0002, as of June 2011. See Docket Browser: Public Input for the Study Regarding the 
Implementation of the Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/
#!searchResults;rpp=25;po=0;s=FSOC-2010-0002;fp=true;ns=true (last visited Feb. 11, 
2013). 
106. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 73, at 10. 
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confirm an extraordinary public interest in the Volcker Rule—the raw number of 
comment letters from private individuals dwarfs the number submitted by all other 
categories of actors combined, including industry actors. 
Pausing yet again to put these data into context, recall that—leaving aside 
a comparatively small number of high-salience issues—most rulemakings receive 
only a limited number of comments, very few of which emanate from individual 
citizens. Instead, the lion’s share of commentary is typically submitted by industry 
members, trade groups, law firms, and political consultants.107 The comment letter 
data thus confirm some level of Volcker Rule salience, including to members of 
the general public. 
Yet, a breakdown of the 1,281 letters submitted by private individuals 
reveals several interesting patterns. Contrary to setting forth an individual 
perspective, over half (nearly 56%) of these comments from private individuals 
use the same form letter, with some slight variations, as the other 6,550 identical 
letters received by FSOC. These letters often add a sentence or two outlining a 
personal hardship arising from the financial crisis or use only a portion of the form 
(typically, the demands). Therefore, these comments were not exactly identical and 
escaped whatever recognition software or rough exclusion methods FSOC 
employed. Yet, they are the same—nearly identical—substantive letter. Thus, of 
the 8,000 letters received by FSOC on the Volcker Rule, 7,316 (or 91%) are a form 
letter. This is roughly consistent with prior findings on individual citizen comment 
activity.108 
Though scholars may debate the extent to which comment letters, 
particularly letters from the general public, can—and should—reveal useful 
information to agencies, such comment letters contain a wealth of information for 
researchers.109 On one hand, the Volcker Rule does have some public salience—
individuals sent in letters by the thousands. Even if that salience is largely a PIG 
creation, the fact that PIGs were able to rally public interest in the issue may 
suggest both something about the issue and about those PIGs’ power. Moreover, as 
detailed in Table 1, other nonindustry participants—including academics, public 
intellectuals, and members of Congress—submitted comments. Though these were 
fewer in number, they contained significantly more substance than the public 
citizen comments, as would be expected. 
At the same time, however, the implications to be drawn from this 
comment activity are probably quite different from the conclusions one might 
draw about the public’s dedication to an issue about which a regulatory body had 
                                                                                                                
107. DeFigueiredo, supra note 102, at 987 (documenting scant individual 
participation in FCC rulemaking, outside of a few high-salience issues); Thomas C. Beierle, 
Discussing the Rules: Electronic Rulemaking and Democratic Deliberation 10–11 
(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/10681/1/dp030022.pdf (same with respect to 
Department of Transportation rulemakings). 
108. See Coglienese, supra note 101, at 953–54; Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, 
Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 449 (2005). 
109. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
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received 8,000 individuated comments expressing both concern about and, 
importantly, knowledge regarding the terms of a particular legislative enactment. 
Certainly, submitting a form letter does not require the same level of investment as 
the detailed comments submitted by financial institutions and trade groups.110 As 
we shall see in Part II.C, Volcker Rule interpretation is also a high-salience issue 
to financial firms, particularly the large banks most affected by it, and they are 
willing to expend large resources toward influencing that interpretation. 
2. The Content 
The remaining 515 comments submitted by private individuals that were 
not traceable to the PIG form letter yield a useful comparison to letters from other 
groups. Table 2 breaks down the comments by group and word count. Figure 2 
displays this information graphically, showing the distribution of word count by 
private individuals not using the PIG form (in light gray), private individuals using 
the form (in dark gray), and all others (in black). 
There are three spikes in the data, at less than 50 words, at 200–249 
words, and at 250–299 words (note the larger sizes of the two far right bins, 
representing comments with 350–799 words and those with 800 words or more). 
The spikes at 200–249 words and 250–299 words represent the PIG form letter and 
its slight variations, discussed above (in its original form the letter is 244 words). 
The spike at comments of less than 50 words represents only letters from private 
individuals. 
The shortest comment—only a single word, “regulate”—was submitted 
by a private individual.111 The longest comment, received from the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), measures 19,500 
words.112 The industry and trade group comments are, as a general rule, lengthy 
and contain cogent arguments in support of a generally narrow interpretation of the 
Volcker Rule’s scope of prohibited activity. Overall, they advance detailed legal 
arguments relying on numerous statutes and cases, reference the Dodd–Frank 
legislative history, and often contain thorough empirical data. Most are 
meticulously argued and carefully drafted. 
                                                                                                                
110. At a minimum, we might conclude that the Volcker Rule is not an issue of 
the highest salience to the public, meaning: “This is my most important issue. I would drop 
whatever I am doing and turn to this issue whenever asked.” Mesquita, supra note 103. The 
same is likely not true for financial institutions affected by the Volcker Rule. See infra Part 
II.D (discussing the financial industry’s investment in influencing Volcker Rule 
implementation); see also Shabnam Mousavi & Hersh Shefrin, Prediction Tools: Financial 
Market Regulation, Politics and Psychology, 3 J. RISK MGMT. FIN. INSTITUTIONS 318, 325–
26 (2010) (assigning a Dodd–Frank salience measure of 99 out of 100 to financial firms). 
111. Comment from Val Laurent, Activist, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 6, 2010), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1094. Punctuation, 
spelling, and typographical errors in this and the following comments are all retained from 
the original sources. 
112. Comment from Randolph Snook, SIFMA, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0908. 
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This does not mean, however, that industry and trade group letters 
necessarily contain unique information and arguments. In fact, a close substantive 
read of these comments suggests that, within each industry subgroup, the 
arguments and evidence are quite similar. As Stuart Benjamin and Art Rai 
conclude in an analysis of industry and trade group comment letters to the Federal 
Communications Commission, “the words differed, but the arguments did not.”113 
In contrast, comments from the general public tend to be short—the 
average word count, excluding the PIG form letters, is only 86, and roughly half of 
the comments, again excluding those using the PIG form letter, are less than 50 
words. In addition, these public comments by and large lack specific suggestions 
or recommendations for interpreting and implementing the Volcker Rule; 
generally urge that the rule be “enforced” or “adopted”; contain many 
grammatical, punctuation, and typographical errors; and express extreme anger at 
the banks and, often, at the political system as well. 
One letter, from which this Article’s title is drawn, aptly illustrates these 
points. Note the writer’s anger and his “working class versus the big banks” 
mentality: 
in regards to the Volker Rule, just how stupid do you think the 
working class is? we just passed the two bills of financial reform 
and here, not even 3 months later, you big banks are at it again to 
screw joe the plummer. aren’t you wondering why everyone is 
preferring to do business at a credit union over a bank? how about 
all of us that have canceled all of our credit cards? whatch it or we 
all might just pull all of our money out of the banks and make you 
go under! and lose your home!114 
Another commenter, echoing a common refrain, considers banks 
criminals and wonders why they are not yet jailed: “Please pass the Volker Law!. I 
am disgusted that banks were deregulated over the last 8 yrs which caused this 
economic disaster and now they want to weaken the laws that were just passed! 
They should be jailed. Where are the arrests!! They are all criminals!”115 
Another, like many of the private individual letter writers, echoes the 
working class versus rich banks theme exemplified by the “joe the plummer” 
commenter. Her family, unlike the “unscrupulous” bank CEOs and shareholders, 
works for its money: 
The Volker Rule is critical to preventing banks from unscrupulous 
banking activities. At the expense of American citizens, their 
dependants, and their posterity banks have made trillions of dollars 
for their CEO’s and shareholders. It is time to stop their inner-circle 
deals and demand justice for every American. I will not allow some 
                                                                                                                
113. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural 
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 74 (2008). 
114. Comment from Ronnie Endre, supra note 1. 
115. Comment from Katherine Myskowski, Public Citizen, REGULATIONS.GOV 
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0528. 
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bank to rob me and my familiy of everything that we work for with 
our blood, sweat, and tears.116 
This raw anger at the banks pervades the public comments. They are 
“fools . . . [and] hogs”117 that should be “put . . . in jail,” and receive “no more 
passes”118 or “bailouts with citizens’ money.”119 Wall Street caused “a HUGE 
amount of destruction and are busily going Who? Me? now.”120 Regulators, for 
their part, must impose “control” lest the banks “continue to screw up,”121 and 
must “[s]top the fraud.”122 Indeed, the entire country is on the wrong track. We 
need to get “back to industry” so that our country “produces and exports things,” 
rather than finance, which “export[s] jobs and produc[es] poverty for people who 
actually work.”123 
Many commenters express dissatisfaction with the political system that 
enabled Wall Street to accumulate so much power. One commenter sees “no 
reason to waste my time voting” unless “we replace the regulations we had on 
Wall Street.”124 Urges another: “Don’t let Big Banks write the rules!”125 One 
writer finds it “craven” that elected officials are accountable to big business, rather 
than to the citizens: 
Obviously we need to do as much as we can to control the banks 
which ruin this country. They have already heisted most of the 
money—to allow them to continue unimpeded would be sheer 
lunacy. We understand the relationship between the money big 
business gives elected officials and the laws that are written and we 
are sick and tired of laws being written by and for big business at 
the expense of human beings. this is craven—there is no other word 
for it—and it much stop. the volker rule and any others that are 
                                                                                                                
116. Comment from Amy Margolis, Lebanon Property Management, 
REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
FSOC-2010-0002-0523. 
117. Comment from Dan Guerena, Change.org, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 4, 
2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0555. 
118. Comment from Katherine Myskowski, Public Citizen, REGULATIONS.GOV 
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0530. 
119. Comment from Abigail Winston, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0285. 
120. Comment from Bill Jaynes, Swan River Software, REGULATIONS.GOV (Oct. 
28 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0294. 
121. Comment from Ann McGill, Public Citizen, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 4, 
2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0430. 
122. Comment from Abigail Winston, supra note 119. 
123. Comment from Dan Guerena, supra note 117. 
124. Comment from Mary Lou Czupek, Public Citizen Member, 
REGULATIONS.GOV (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
FSOC-2010-0002-0240. 
125. Comment from Victor Escobar, Member of Americans for Financial Reform, 
REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 03, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
FSOC-2010-0002-1058. 
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meant to regulate the banks and keep more people’s money from 
disappearing in the maw of corporate america the better.126 
Though some consider regulators, like the banks they regulate, “crooks 
[who] will ignore this,”127 others urge regulators to stand firm against the 
“rapacious financial institutions”: 
Surely you understand the necessity of standing firm for the subject 
prohibitions as promoted by the distinguished Paul Volcker. You 
will be facing gale force threats, bribes, and deceptions from 
financial institutions who have amply proved they care not one whit 
for the economic health of the country, for the strategic national 
interest, or even the longevity of their own institutions; 
subordinating all of this to their greed for bonuses that can lock in 
generations of family wealth in just a few years of gambling with 
other people’s money. Without the full strength of this prohibition, 
the nation is doomed to be blackmailed again to rescue a kidnapped 
economy. You can’t allow this, if you have one shred of integrity. 
You must ignore the promises and prospects for lucrative 
employment by the rapacious financial institutions anf do what is 
right.128 
These letters are notable for several reasons and confirm many of the 
intuitions gleaned from the review of the Dodd–Frank legislative process in Part I, 
and the analysis of form letters in the prior Subsection. The individual citizen 
letters reveal disgust and anger over perceived Wall Street excesses and expose a 
“Wall Street versus Main Street” mentality. People are angry about the economy, 
about the plight of working people, and about the politicians who they hold 
responsible for these outcomes. But importantly, the citizen letters provide no 
substantive guidance to FSOC on how to interpret and enforce the Volcker Rule’s 
complex and ambiguous provisions. Indeed, the letters provide little evidence that 
commenters even understand, or care, what proprietary trading or fund investment 
is, much less the ways in which the Volcker Rule might govern such activities.129 
                                                                                                                
126. Comment from Rachel Kaplan, the Village Way, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 5, 
2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0966. 
127. Comment from Leo Stack, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0990. 
128. Comment from Critz George, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 6, 2010), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1202. 
129. DeFigueiredo and Cuéllar each find similar results. DeFigueiredo’s 
examination of FCC filings from 1999 to 2004 reveals that the media ownership rules 
received more filings than any other issue but were largely identical texts, mass electronic 
mailings, and simple click-throughs that failed to demonstrate an individual understanding 
of the complex issues. DeFigueiredo, supra note 102. Cuéllar’s analysis of three rules 
issued by the Treasury Department, the Federal Election Committee (“FEC”), and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) concluded that “[i]ndividual commenters often 
came across as being angry and exasperated,” failed to understand “the distinction between 
the regulation and the statute,” and rarely offered “anything remotely resembling a concrete 
proposal.” Cuéllar, supra note 108, at 443. 
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The contrast with the meticulously drafted, argued, and researched—though far 
less numerous—letters from financial industry members and trade groups is stark.	
D. The Meeting Logs 
1. Introduction 
As part of the new transparency efforts associated with Dodd–Frank 
implementation, the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, CFTC, SEC, and 
FDIC began disclosing their contacts regarding Dodd–Frank shortly after the bill 
was signed into law in July 2010. These logs give some insight into the work of 
Dodd–Frank statutory interpretation and implementation that goes on behind 
closed doors: Who is meeting with the regulators that will ultimately determine the 
scope of the Volcker Rule? What interests do they represent? What are the topics 
on which they are meeting? What questions are being asked and answered, and 
what sort of information is being conveyed? These logs are especially noteworthy 
given the previously discussed importance of the preproposal period to final policy 
outcomes, combined with the traditional inaccessibility of this data. 
There is wide variation in the amount and quality of information provided 
by the federal agency meeting logs concerning the Volcker Rule, both across 
agencies and across meetings for any given agency. As a general rule, the Federal 
Reserve’s logs were the most detailed, while the CFTC’s contained the least 
information. Although all agency logs disclose the date, starting time, and format 
of the meeting (for example, a conference call versus a live meeting), as well as 
the names and affiliations of the parties in attendance, there are large differences in 
the level of detail surrounding the subject matter of the meeting. Some meeting 
logs disclose only that the parties met to discuss the Volcker Rule,130 while others 
provide detail on the specific topics discussed, as well as the parties’ positions on 
those topics. For example, according to Federal Reserve meeting logs, at a January 
20, 2012 meeting American Bankers Association representatives raised concerns 
about the application of the Volcker Rule to small banks, argued that some small 
banks were surprised to learn that the Volcker Rule may apply to their activities, 
and expressed concerns that some banks could not comply with the Volcker Rule 
by the July 21, 2012 effective date.131 
Despite these differences, it is possible to form educated guesses about 
the general content of the meetings, even when detailed meeting logs are absent. 
Often, parties that met with federal agencies on the Volcker Rule also submitted 
comment letters. These comment letters provide some insight into the likely 
concerns and positions raised during agency meetings. This mechanism—
                                                                                                                
130. See, e.g., External Meetings: Americans for Financial Reform, U.S. 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM., http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/Dodd
FrankAct/ExternalMeetings/dfmeeting_031212_1433 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
131. FED. RESERVE, MEETING BETWEEN FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF AND 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION JANUARY 20, 2012 (2012), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-commpublic/aba-meeting-20120
120.pdf. 
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extrapolating information regarding informal participation from formal 
participation records—has been used by other researchers for similar purposes, for 
example, to estimate ex parte contacts.132 
In addition, one can sometimes divine the likely content (or, at least, 
eliminate certain content) of meetings based on the combination of participants. A 
participant at a meeting that includes representatives of Goldman Sachs, J.P. 
Morgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley, for example, is unlikely to be meeting for the 
purpose of urging the relevant agency to apply the Volcker Rule in a manner that 
severely restricts banking entity activity. 
2. The Numbers 
Table 3 shows the federal agency meetings with financial institutions in 
which the Volcker Rule was discussed. These meetings occurred between July 21, 
2010, the date of presidential signing, and October 11, 2011, the date of the 
NRPM. J.P., Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley met with 
federal agencies most frequently on the Volcker Rule, with 27, 22, and 19 
meetings, respectively. This accounts for nearly 20% of financial institution 
meetings with federal agencies on the Volcker Rule.133 In total, there were 351 
financial institution meetings with federal regulators regarding the Volcker Rule 
during this time period, which accounts for more than 78% of all such meetings 
during the relevant time period, as shown by Table 8 and Figure 3. 
Table 4 shows federal agency meetings with law firms in which the 
Volcker Rule was discussed. Each of these law firms represents financial 
institutions or financial industry trade groups, and representatives of those 
institutions or trade groups were typically also in attendance at each meeting. In 
total, these law firms met with the federal agencies charged with Volcker Rule 
implementation 35 times during the relevant time period. Sullivan & Cromwell, 
Davis Polk, and Debevoise met most frequently with federal regulators, with 11, 9, 
and 8 meetings each. 
Table 5 shows federal agency meetings with financial industry trade 
associations, lobbyists, and policy advisors to discuss the Volcker Rule—a total of 
32 meetings. SIFMA and the Financial Services Roundtable met most frequently 
with federal agencies—eight and five times, respectively. 
Table 6 shows federal agency meetings with public interest, labor, 
research, and advocacy groups to discuss the Volcker Rule—a total of 19 
meetings, nearly 40% of which are with labor union representatives.134 Finally, 
                                                                                                                
132. See, e.g., Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-
Proposal Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. 
RES. & THEORY 373, 381–82 (2012) (using this technique and citing similar uses). 
133. “Financial institution” is defined broadly in this Subsection to include not 
only commercial and investment banks, but also asset managers, investment advisors, and 
insurance companies. 
134. Labor unions are included in Table 6 because of their advocacy on behalf of 
a strong Volcker Rule. 
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Table 7 shows a total of 12 meetings by other persons and organizations: namely, 
Senators Merkley and Levin and their staffs and Paul Volcker and his staff. 
In sum, whereas financial industry representatives met with federal 
agencies on the Volcker Rule a total of 351 times, there were only 31 meetings 
with entities or groups that might reasonably be expected to act as a counterweight 
to industry representatives in terms of the information provided and the types of 
interpretations pressed (those listed in Tables 6 and 7). This is nearly the same 
number of times that a single financial institution—J.P. Morgan Chase—met with 
federal agencies on Volcker Rule interpretation and implementation. As shown by 
Table 8 and Figure 3, financial institutions, financial industry trade groups, and 
law firms representing such institutions and trade groups collectively accounted for 
93.1% of all federal agency Volcker Rule meetings, whereas public interest, 
research, advocacy, and labor groups, and other persons and organizations, 
accounted for only 6.9%. 
This is not meant to suggest that these very different types of financial 
industry members raised identical concerns at every meeting. To the contrary, the 
exact subject matter of the meetings appeared to differ according to the particular 
regulatory concern faced by each group. The important point for these purposes, 
however, is that nearly all of the industry representatives that met with federal 
agencies on the Volcker Rule were seeking clarifications on the rule’s application 
to their activities—most often, a clarification that the Volcker Rule would not 
prohibit the activities in question. 
This latter observation is an important point, as dissension among 
important industry actors ensures that agencies will receive competing views and 
information on the Volcker Rule, even in the absence of effective participation by 
public interest groups and other potential watchdogs. For example, one might have 
predicted that some industry segments—perhaps, hedge funds—would view 
banks’ proprietary trading activities as competing with their own operations and 
would advocate on behalf of the Volcker Rule in order to advance their own 
competitive positions. But this is not the case. Instead, the meeting logs, when 
combined with the comment letters, suggest that hedge and private equity fund 
Volcker Rule activity has largely centered on the rule’s impact on their own 
activities. Specifically, hedge and private equity fund comment letters and meeting 
logs reveal concerns that restrictions on banks’ fund investments will economically 
harm the hedge and private equity fund business, request delays in implementation 
and effective dates, and argue that the Volcker Rule should be interpreted narrowly 
to permit certain fund investment activity by banks.135 
                                                                                                                
135. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE, MEETING BETWEEN FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF 
AND REPRESENTATIVES OF BLACKROCK, INC. (“BLACKROCK”) JUNE 30, 2011 (2011), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-commpublic/black_rock_
meeting_20110630.pdf (discussing the Volcker Rule’s impact on BlackRock’s business 
model); Letter from Alternative Investment Management Association to Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://www.aima.org/objects_store/aima_-
_comments_to_fsoc_on_nbfcs_-_5_nov_10.pdf (noting the potential adverse impact of the 
Volcker Rule’s restrictions on the hedge and private equity fund industry); Letter from 
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Similarly, Senators Merkley and Levin (the Volcker Rule’s sponsors), 
among others, promoted the Volcker Rule as a means to reduce conflicts of interest 
between banking entities and their customers caused by proprietary trading 
operations.136 One might, therefore, predict that large institutional investors would 
be highly involved in Volcker rulemaking, to ensure that this purported benefit of 
the legislation is not undercut. However, large institutional investors are notably 
absent from Volcker Rule administrative activity, at least in the preproposal phase. 
Although the Council of Institutional Investors submitted a comment letter 
supporting the Volcker Rule, it is short (under 300 words) and nonsubstantive.137 
The Council did not meet with agencies in person on the Volcker Rule, though it 
did meet in connection with other Dodd–Frank provisions.138 On the rare occasions 
when institutional investors met with federal agencies on the Volcker Rule, the 
topic appears to concern the Volcker Rule’s application to their own activities, 
rather than to the proprietary trading or fund activities of banking entities.139 
Moreover, not all agency meetings are created equal. Many of the 
meetings in Table 3 are group meetings, often part of an industry trade association 
meeting. For example, 27 separate financial institution representatives were listed 
in attendance at an April 7, 2011 SIFMA–SEC meeting with Chairman Schapiro. 
Perhaps more telling, nearly all of the Table 6 contacts are group 
meetings of this type. For example, representatives of AFL-CIO, Laborer’s 
International Union of America, AFSCME, and SEIU are logged for an October 
13, 2010 SEC meeting with Kayla J. Gillan and Jim Burns. These are four of the 
five meetings by public interest, labor, and advocacy groups with the SEC 
(Americans for Financial Reform met separately with the SEC on April 13, 2011). 
And all of the CFTC meetings with public interest, labor, and advocacy groups on 
the Volcker Rule took place together, on March 16, 2011. 
In addition, the identity (or number) of agency representatives at certain 
meetings may signal something about the importance of the event. For example, 
                                                                                                                
Private Equity Growth Capital Council to Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 
78 (expressing concern about the impact of the Volcker Rule on private equity funds). 
136. See Merkley & Levin, supra note 4, at 549 (“The Merkley–Levin provisions’ 
broad restrictions on proprietary trading should significantly reduce the opportunities for 
conflicts of interest in trading.”). 
137. E-mail from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, 
to Timothy Franz Geithner, Chairman, Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Oct. 28, 2010), 
available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/12382/councilinstitutionalinvestors-
letter-to-fsoc.txt (supporting the Volcker Rule due to the conflicts of interest created by 
proprietary trading at depository institutions and their holding companies). 
138. FED. RESERVE, MEETING BETWEEN FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF AND 
REPRESENTATIVES OF INVESTORS IN MORTGAGE PRODUCTS APRIL 6, 2011 (2011), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-commpublic/investors_mortgage_201104
06.pdf (discussing section 941 of the Dodd–Frank Act). 
139. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE, MEETING BETWEEN FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF 
AND REPRESENTATIVES OF TIAA-CREF OCT. 19, 2010 (2010), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-commpublic/TIAA_CREF_Meeting_20101019.pdf 
(discussing the application of the Volcker Rule’s restrictions to insurance companies). 
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the log for an August 3, 2010 CFTC meeting with SIFMA and ISDA at which the 
Volcker Rule was discussed (along with other Dodd–Frank provisions) lists 53 
SEC and CFTC staff members in attendance. But Goldman Sachs’ CEO, Lloyd 
Blankfein, is logged as meeting alone with SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro; Chief 
of Staff Didem Nisanci; and Robert Cook, Director of Trading & Markets, on 
March 9, 2011. Mr. Blankfein met with Chairman Schapiro again on October 8, 
2010 at an SEC–Financial Services Roundtable meeting, at which Jamie Dimon of 
J.P. Morgan, Robert H. Benmosche (President and CEO of AIG), Richard K. 
Davis (President and CEO of U.S. Bancorp), and other major financial institution 
CEOs are logged as being in attendance. 
3. Section Summary 
The meeting log data reaffirm the impression gained from the analysis in 
prior Subsections: The Volcker Rule contained substantial gaps and ambiguities on 
key issues, generating an intense interest in the rule’s implementation that began as 
soon as the legislation was signed. Notably, federal agency contacts with industry 
representatives significantly outpace those of any other group in terms of both 
quantity and quality. This finding is consistent with the limited number of other 
studies examining the preproposal period.140 
Moreover, financial industry interests appear, at least from these data, 
more unified in their interests than press reports and the legislative history would 
predict, reducing the probability that conflict among powerful interest groups will 
diminish the influence of any single position. This is an important finding, and one 
that can be discerned only by an examination of agency-level data. Prior research 
has documented a measurable influence of preproposal interest group activity on 
final agency rules when there is a high level of consensus among those groups.141 
Finally, the data demonstrate continuing interest in, and oversight of, the 
Volcker Rule by Senators Merkley and Levin (the provision’s sponsors) and by 
Paul Volcker (the provision’s original architect).142 While it is true that other 
members of Congress hostile to the Volcker Rule have also remained involved in 
the rulemaking process, those contacts appear, at least based on documented 
evidence, limited to comment letter activity.143 No other congressional members or 
elected officials have committed the human capital that Merkley, Levin, and 
Volcker have. Is this attention sufficient to offset any superior influence enjoyed 
by a unified regulated industry? It is impossible to determine from these data at 
this stage of the rulemaking process. However, Susan Webb Yackee finds that the 
                                                                                                                
140. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 14, at 125 (“[The] pre-NPRM 
period was almost completely monopolized by regulated parties.”). 
141. David Nelson & Susan Webb Yackee, Lobbying Coalitions and Government 
Policy Change: An Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking, 74 J. POL. 339, 340 (2012). 
142. See infra Table 7. 
143. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
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more congressional attention a rule enjoys, the less interest group influence the 
final rule exhibits.144 
CONCLUSION 
Statutes, like contracts, can be more or less complete, but will inevitably 
have some gaps and ambiguities that courts or agencies must fill. In neither 
setting—contract or statute—is this outcome necessarily bad.145 To the contrary, 
lawmakers may delegate such discretionary authority to other governmental 
branches for a variety of salutary reasons. For example, statutory incompleteness 
may allow lawmakers to harness the expertise of courts and agencies, provide the 
flexibility to adapt the statute to changing circumstances, or reduce the transaction 
costs associated with lawmaking.146 
Proprietary trading and fund investment are technical questions of 
financial regulation about which federal agencies have substantial expertise and 
experience. Understandably, Congress relied on that experience and expertise for 
much of the definitional work of the Volcker Rule. But the Volcker Rule is not by 
any means the type of low-salience rule that characterizes the bulk of daily 
administrative work. Instead, the political conditions surrounding Dodd–Frank’s 
passage suggest unusual populist pressure to address the perceived power and 
problems posed by large financial institutions, which the public blamed for the 
financial crisis, the bailouts that followed it, and the continuing economic woes of 
the average working American. This populist pressure was met with intense 
lobbying by affected financial institutions in an effort to, if not stave off regulation 
entirely, at least minimize the damage that financial reform would cause. As 
evidenced by the data, that populist pressure and industry interest continued into 
the rulemaking phase. 
Against this economic and political background, Dodd–Frank arose, 
purportedly to stop “‘too big to fail’ [and] to protect the American taxpayer by 
ending bailouts.”147 But the Volcker Rule—largely an afterthought by the Obama 
administration, which considered the rule unworkable and unnecessary—was an 
essential concession to gain political support from Dodd–Frank critics who argued 
that the law did too little to restrict risky banks. As a result, the Volcker Rule—like 
many other Dodd–Frank provisions—entered the rulemaking process both highly 
incomplete and highly contested, thus ensuring the importance of the rulemaking 
process and of interest group attempts to influence that process. 
                                                                                                                
144. Susan Webb Yackee, Assessing Inter-Institutional Attention to and Influence 
on Government Regulations, 36 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 723, 725 (2006). 
145. Parties may leave contractual gaps and ambiguities for a variety of innocuous 
reasons, including bounded rationality and the high transaction costs of specifying precisely 
all future contingencies. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989). Such gaps may also be 
strategic. Id. at 94. 
146. See generally Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default 
Canon, 72. GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663 (2004). 
147. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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Thanks to the Obama administration’s new transparency efforts under 
Dodd–Frank, scholars are able to view that agency-level activity from the moment 
after presidential signing—well before the NPRM phase that triggers most of the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s docketing and transparency requirements. This 
information, seldom available to researchers up to this point, confirms what, with 
the exception of a handful of studies, has been largely an intuition: The 
preproposal phase is a battleground for agenda setting and that battleground is 
dominated by regulated industry. Though this Article ends with the NPRM and 
thus cannot document the effectiveness of these attempts, other researchers have 
found such preproposal activity critical to final rule development.148 
Countervailing voices were not entirely absent on the Volcker Rule. 
Angry citizens sent in letters by the thousands, potentially shading FSOC’s view of 
the public salience of the Volcker Rule and of the relative power of relevant PIGs. 
But the comment letter findings are consistent with much prior research on public 
comment letters—they are short, angry, duplicative, and provide little, if any, 
useful substantive information. It is precisely this type of data that has prompted 
some researchers to question the efficiency and utility of informal notice and 
comment as a means of generating public input.149 
 Other countervailing voices include PIGs, academics, and three 
individuals involved in crafting the original legislation—Senators Merkley and 
Levin and Paul Volcker. This latter group, as suggested by prior research, may be 
a particularly effective counterweight to regulated industry. 
Finally, there is a notable lack of countervailing voices within the 
financial industry itself. Industry segments, such as institutional investors, that 
might (based on press reports and the legislative history) be expected to fight any 
weakening of Volcker Rule protections that supposedly accrue to their benefit are 
almost entirely absent from the preproposal stage. Whether this is because the 
benefits of the legislation to those parties was overstated, or because, for whatever 
reason, they have found it unnecessary to join in Volcker Rule administrative 
activity during the preproposal phase is unclear, though research on later 
rulemaking stages should shed light on this question. 
                                                                                                                
148. See, e.g., Keith Naughton et al., Understanding Commenter Influence During 
Agency Rule Development, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 258 (2009). 
149. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 113, at 74–75; DeFigueiredo, supra note 102, at 
992–93. 
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Table 1: Number of Comments by Submitter 
Private Individuals 1,281 93.2% 
Private Individuals Using Public Citizen Form 766 55.7% 
Private Individuals Not Using Public Citizen Form 515 37.5% 
Industry Trade Groups 26 1.9% 
Asset Management 16 1.2% 
Public Interest, Research, Advocacy, and Labor 
Groups 14 1.0% 
Academics/Public Intellectuals 12 0.9% 
Insurance Companies/Employee Benefits 10 0.7% 
Financial Institutions 8 0.6% 
Congress 7 0.5% 
Total 1,374 100% 
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  Longest Comment 
 
19,500 
  Shortest Comment 
 
1 
  All Private Individuals 187 239,547 
      Private Individuals Not Using PIG Form 86 44,290 
  Academics/Public Intellectuals 1,522 18,264 
  Asset Management 2,055 32,880 
  Congress 2,651 18,557 
  Insurance Companies/Employee 
  Benefits 2,761 27,610 
  Public Interest, Research, Advocacy, 
  and Labor Groups 3,465 48,508 
  Financial Institutions 3,852 30,816 
  Industry Trade Groups 4,027 104,702 
  All 379 520,884 
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Table 3: Financial Institution Meetings with Federal Agencies to Discuss 
the Volcker Rule, July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011 
Organization Treasury CFTC SEC Federal Reserve FDIC Total % 
J.P. Morgan 
Chase 8 2 6 11   27 7.7 
Goldman Sachs 7 2 7 6   22 6.3 
Morgan Stanley 2 2 7 6 2 19 5.4 
Bank of 
America 2 2 5 6   15 4.3 
Barclays 2 2 4 6   14 4 
Credit Suisse 2 1 6 5   14 4 
Citigroup 2 1 4 6   13 3.7 
BNY Mellon 4 1 4 2   11 3.1 
RBC 1   5 4 1 11 3.1 
State Street 2 1 4 4   11 3.1 
Deutsche Bank 1 2 3 3   9 2.6 
GE Capital 3   3 3   9 2.6 
BlackRock 3   3 2   8 2.3 
Wells Fargo 2 1 3 1   7 2 
BB&T 2   1 2 1 6 1.7 
BNP Paribas   3 1 1   5 1.4 
Prudential 1   2 2   5 1.4 
MetLife 1   2 1   4 1.1 
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RBS 2   1 1   4 1.1 
UBS 1   1 2   4 1.1 
HSBC 1     2   3 0.9 
Northern Trust 1   1 1   3 0.9 








    1 2   3 0.9 
Sun Trust 1   1 1   3 0.9 
U.S. Bancorp 1   2     3 0.9 
Allstate     2     2 0.6 
Ameriprise 
Financial 1   1     2 0.6 
Brown Brothers 
Harriman 1     1   2 0.6 
Edward Jones     2     2 0.6 
Harris Bank 1   1     2 0.6 
ING     1 1   2 0.6 
Lincoln 
Financial 1     1   2 0.6 
Millennium 
Partners 1 1       2 0.6 
Nationwide 1     1   2 0.6 
Nomura 1     1   2 0.6 
Pyramis Global 
Advisors 1 1       2 0.6 
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Societe 
Generale   1 1     2 0.6 
T. Rowe Price 2         2 0.6 
The Hartford 1     1   2 0.6 
TIAA-CREF 1     1   2 0.6 
Zions Bank 1   1     2 0.6 
AIG     1     1 0.3 
Alexandra & 







1         1 0.3 
Allianz 1         1 0.3 
Arab Bank Plc       1   1 0.3 
Atlanta Capital 
Management   1       1 0.3 
AXA Financial     1     1 0.3 
Banco Itau 
BBA       1   1 0.3 
BancWest Corp     1     1 0.3 
Bank of 
Montreal       1   1 0.3 
BankcorpSouth     1     1 0.3 
Brevan Howard 1         1 0.3 
BTM UFJ       1   1 0.3 
Cantor 
Fitzgerald     1     1 0.3 




1         1 0.3 
Capstone 1         1 0.3 
Carlyle 1         1 0.3 
Charles 
Schwab & Co. 1         1 0.3 
CIBC World 
Markets Corp.       1   1 0.3 
City National 
Bank     1     1 0.3 
Comerica Inc. 1         1 0.3 
Commerzbank 
AG       1   1 0.3 
Credit Agricole       1   1 0.3 
Crossroads 
Strategies LLC 1         1 0.3 
Davidson 




1         1 0.3 
Dodge & Cox 1         1 0.3 
Estrada 
Hinojosa     1     1 0.3 
Fidelity     1     1 0.3 
Fifth Third 
Bancorp 1         1 0.3 
Glenview 
Capital 1         1 0.3 
Highfields 
Capital 1         1 0.3 




1         1 0.3 
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    1     1 0.3 
Jefferies     1     1 0.3 




1         1 0.3 
Knight Capital 
Group     1     1 0.3 
Loomis, Sayles 
& Company     1     1 0.3 
Lord Abbett & 
Co.     1     1 0.3 
LPL Financial     1     1 0.3 
M.R. Beal & 
Company     1     1 0.3 








      1   1 0.3 
Moore Capital 
Management 1         1 0.3 
National 
Australia Bank       1   1 0.3 
National Bank 




      1   1 0.3 




    1     1 0.3 




    1     1 0.3 
PIMCO 1         1 0.3 
PioneerPath 
Capital 1         1 0.3 
Protective Life 
Corp.     1     1 0.3 
Putnam 
Investments 1         1 0.3 
Raymond 
James Financial     1     1 0.3 
Round Table 









1         1 0.3 
Standard 
Chartered Bank       1   1 0.3 
Stephens Inc.     1     1 0.3 
Stifel, Nicolaus 
& Company     1     1 0.3 
SVB Financial 
Group   1       1 0.3 
Swiss Re     1     1 0.3 
TD Bank 1         1 0.3 
Thomson 
Reuters       1   1 0.3 




      1   1 0.3 
Toyota     1     1 0.3 




1         1 0.3 
UnionBanCal 
Corp     1     1 0.3 
Unum     1     1 0.3 
USAA 1         1 0.3 








1         1 0.3 
Wiley Bros.     1     1 0.3 
Total           351 100% 
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Table 4: Federal Agency Meetings with Law Firms to Discuss  
the Volcker Rule, July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011 
Organization Treasury CFTC SEC Federal Reserve FDIC Total % 
Sullivan & 
Cromwell 2 2 2 4 1 11 31.4 
Davis Polk  3 3 3  9 25.7 
Debevoise & 
Plimpton 3  2 3  8 22.9 
WilmerHale 1   1  2 5.7 
Barnett, Sivon 




   1  1 2.9 
Haynes & 
Boone, LLP    1  1 2.9 
Schiff Hardin   1   1 2.9 
Skadden Arps    1  1 2.9 
Total      35 100% 
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Table 5: Federal Agency Meetings with Trade Associations,  
Lobbyists, or Policy Advisors to Discuss the Volcker Rule,   
July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011 
Organization Treasury CFTC SEC Federal Reserve FDIC Total % 




  2 2 1 5 15.2 
American 
Council of Life 
Insurers 
1  1 1  3 9.1 
ABA Securities 






1  1   2 6.1 
Clearinghouse 




   2  2 6.1 
Managed Funds 






   1  1 3.0 
Greg Wilson 
Consulting   1   1 3.0 




1     1 3.0 
The Financial 
Services Forum   1   1 3.0 
Washington 
Analysis  1    1 3.0 
Woodbine 
Associates   1   1 3.0 
Total      33 100% 
	
96 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 55:53 
	
Table 6: Federal Agency Meetings with Public Interest, Labor,  
Research, and Advocacy Groups to Discuss the Volcker Rule,   
July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011 




2 1 1 1  5 26.3 
AFL-CIO 1 1 1   3 15.8 
AFSCME 1  1   2 10.5 
Demos 1 1    2 10.5 
Public Citizen 1 1    2 10.5 





  1   1 5.3 







1     1 5.3 
University of 
Massachusetts 1     1 5.3 
Total      19 100% 
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Table 7: Federal Agency Meetings with Other Persons and Organizations 
to Discuss the Volcker Rule, July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011 








 1 3 1  5 41.7 
Paul Volcker 
and/or Staff  1  1  2 16.7 
Total      12 100% 
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Table 8: Federal Agency Meetings to Discuss the Volcker Rule:  













































Council of Life 
Insurers 






America 15 WilmerHale 2 
ABA Securities 
Association 2 Demos 2     











1 Clearinghouse Association 2 Better Markets 1     









1     
BNY 
Mellon 11 Schiff Hardin 1 
Managed Funds 
Association 2 SEIU 1     











1     
State Street 11     Greg Wilson Consulting 1 
University of 
Massachusetts 1     
Deutsche 
Bank 9     ISDA 1         




1         
BlackRock 8     The Financial Services Forum 1         
Wells Fargo 7     Washington Analysis 1         




155                 
Total 351   35   33   19   12 
% 78   7.8   7.3   4.2   2.7 
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Appendix: Public Interest Group Form Letter 
Just two years after the Wall Street banks were bailed out and just three months 
after we passed a tough new law to rein them in, the Wall Street bankers want 
weak regulations so they can keep making risky bets with your money. 
Because of the upcoming election, the banks thought nobody would notice that 
they redeployed their army of more than 1,500 lobbyists to try to weaken the new 
rules as they’re being written. 
They were wrong. We noticed. And we need your help to fight back. 
Regulators are accepting public comments on the new law’s important “Volcker 
rule.” The rule is named for a vocal White House official who called on Congress 
to stop banks from making risky bets for their own profit while relying on taxpayer 
bailouts if the bets go bad. 
Here’s how you can help: 
1. Follow this link, and you’ll get to the page where you can submit a comment 
about the Volcker rule. 
2. Next, cut and paste the SAMPLE COMMENT that follows this message into the 
comment box. Fill out all the required information. 
3. In the required field that asks for your “Organization Name” write “PUBLIC 
CITIZEN MEMBER.” 
4. Click “Submit.” 
The banks have already submitted their regulatory comments. Now it’s our turn! 
The Volcker rule will prevent banks from trying to make a quick buck by 
betting—and possibly losing—trillions of dollars and leaving you with the tab. 
It’s your money that the regulators should be protecting, not the big banks’ risky 
practices. 
Follow this link to submit your comment. 
Please copy and paste the SAMPLE COMMENT below. Feel free to edit it and 
add your perspective on the economic crisis: 
RE: Docket ID: FSOC-2010-0002—Public Input for the Study Regarding the 
Implementation of the Prohibition on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Relationships With Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds. 
Dear Members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: 
I am writing as a concerned citizen affected by the financial meltdown and bailouts 
caused by Wall Street banks’ high-risk trading. I am submitting this comment 
pursuant to the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s (FSOC) request for 
comment on Sections 619–621 of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. 
Banks should be in the business of lending to America’s small businesses and 
families, not using our money to run a private casino where the House always 
wins. We never again want to be left on the hook for bad bets by Wall Street. 
2013] FINANCIAL REFORM 103 
I urge regulators to implement a strong Volcker Rule: 
1) Don’t let the exceptions swallow the rule. If banks are profiting from swings in 
prices, that’s prohibited proprietary trading, plain and simple. 
2) The rule cannot allow hedge fund bailouts. Bear Stearns ended up spending $3 
billion bailing out a hedge fund in which it had invested just $35 million. 
3) Regulators must ban any activity that allows banks to bet against their 
customers, or for that matter creates any material conflict of interest between 
banks and their customers. Regulators should investigate the full range of ways 
that Wall Street insiders are profiting at the expense of the rest of us, collect all the 
trading data needed to monitor the system and protect taxpayers, and then use their 
new powers to crack down on abuses. 
Thank you for your consideration of my views. 
